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THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS
AFFECTING SALES OF GOODS
LLOYD J. PLANERT*

H

ISTORICALLY, the Wisconsin Statute of frauds affecting sales
of goods is derived from the English statute enacted in 1677.1
The English legislation was incorporated into our statutory law in
1849 and has since remained there without substantial change or amendment. 2 The purpose of the Wisconsin statute 3 is the same as that of
the English statute, namely to prevent fraud by avoiding the enforcement of baseless sales through perjured oral testimony, the means provided by the statute being a requirement of written or otherwise adequate evidence of the transaction. 4
The Wisconsin statute provides that no contract to sell or sale of
any goods or choses in action of the value of fifty dollars or upwards
shall be enforceable by action unless 1) a contract to sell or sale valid
at common law is shown, and 2) the statute of frauds is satisfied in
one of three specified ways. 5 These three alternate methods of complying with the statute are as follows: 1) the buyer must "accept part
of the goods or choses in action so contracted to be sold or sold, and
actually receive the same" ;6 or 2) the buyer must "give something
in earnest to bind the contract, or in part payment" ;7 or 3) there must
be some "note or memorandum in writing of the contract or sale ...
signed by the party to be charged or his agent in that behalf." S Until
the making of a contract to sell or sale and a compliance with one of
the three specified means of satisfying the statute has been proved, no
recovery can be had on the alleged contract; the defendant can withdraw without liability.) This is a firmly established rule and cannot be
derogated or abrogated by any custom or conduct of the parties in
prior transactions. 10
* A.B., LL.B., Member of Wisconsin Bar.
1Korrer v. Madden, 152 Wis. 646, 140 N.W. 325 (1913) ; 29 Car. Ic 3.
2 Korrer v. Madden, 152 Wis. 646, 140 N.W. 375 (1913).
3 Wis. STAT. (1941) § 121.04.
4 Gross v. Heckert, 120 Wis. 314, 97 N.W. 952 (1904); HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY
OF ENGLISH LAW, Vol. VI, pp. 384, 386.
5 Wis. STAT. (1941) § 121.04(1); Coastwise Petroleum Co. v. Standard Oil

Co., 19 A. (2d) 180 (1941); Green v. Penn. Steel Co., 75 Md. 109, 23 Atl. 139
(1891); Hearn v. Ruark, 148 Md. 354, 129 AtI. 366; Record Mfg. Co. v. Massey, 151 Md. 348, 133 AtI. 836 (1926).

6 Wis.STAT. (1941)
7 Idens.
8 Idem.

§ 121.04(1).

9 Supra, note 5.
10 Coastwise Petroleum Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 19 A. (2d) 180 (1941).
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While the statute seems clear enough, yet its application to many
and different transactions has naturally given rise to varying questions
and divergent views of solution. A consideration of some of these
questions and the interpretation which the Wisconsin Supreme Court
and the courts of other jurisdictions have placed upon the statute, is
the purpose of this paper.
A question that arises at the outset in a cause involving the statute
of frauds, is one of pleading, namely, whether the statute must be
pleaded as an affirmative defense or may be relied on under a denial of
the contract of sale. The authorities are thoroughly divided on this
question, some declaring that advantage may be taken of the statute
under a simple denial of the contract, 1' while others following the
English rule,' 2 require it to be affirmatively pleaded. 3 The Rules
of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States,
likewise require the Statute of Frauds to be set up as an affirmative defense.'14 Since under the wording used in the statute "shall
not be enforceable by action" a transaction is not entirely void
without a writing but merely unenforceable' 5 it would seem that the
authorities requiring the statute to be affirmatively pleaded present
the sounder view. While Wisconsin in Flatley Brothersv. Beauregard,6
seems to have aligned itself with the states holding that the statute
need not be affirmatively pleaded, it should be noted that this decision
is expressly based on a second version of the statute of frauds found
in the Wisconsin Statutes at the time of that decision in 1927, namely
Section 241.03 which provided that any contract in violation of the
statute of frauds shall be "void." Section 241.03 was repealed in 1931"
so that when the question again comes up for determination, Wisconsin probably will align itself with the states and the Federal Rules
which require the statute to be affirmatively pleaded.
" Connecticut Practice Book, 1934, No. 104; Flatley Bros. Co. v. Beauregard, 192
Wis. 174, 212 Wis. 262 (1927) ; Mason-Heflin Coal Co. v. Currie (1921) 270
12

Pa. 221, 113 Atl. 202; Franklin Sugar Refining Co. v. Eiseman (1927) 290 Pa.
486, 139 AtI. 147; Quinn-Sheperdson Co. v. Triumph Farmers' Elevator Co.
(1921) 149 Minn. 24, 182 N.W. 710.

Order 19 Rule 15, The Annual Practice (1936) p. 361.

Civ. Prac. Act N.Y. 242; Kottler v. New York Bargain Home (1926) 242
N.Y. 28, 150 N.E. 591, reargument and motion to amend remittitur denied
242 N.Y. 568, 152 N.E. 430; Morrison v. Holmes & Volz, 241 App. Div. 907,
271 N.Y.S. 1040; Widmeyer v. Crane, 121 Misc. Rep. 309, 200 N.Y.S. 875;
Abraham v. Durward (1920) 46 N.D. 611, 180 N.W. 783.
24 Rule 8 (c).
15 West v. Kenny (1920) 229 Ill. App. 49; Webster v. Condon (1924) 248 Mass.
269, 142 N.E. 777; Maddaloni Olive Oil Co. v. Aquino (1920) 191 App. Div. 51,
189 N.Y.S. 724; Webster-Tapper Co. v. Eastern Hay Co. (1916) 39 R.I. 482,
98 Atl. 50; Abraham v. Durward (1920) 46 N.D. 611, 180 N.W. 783.
16 192 Wis. 174, 212 N.W. 22.
'3

17 1931 c. 470. s. 8.
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As to the subject-matter within the statute,' an examination of its
provisions discloses that it includes two types of contracts, namely, a
"contract to sell" and a "sale"; it also reveals that the statute is applicable to two definite classes of subject matter, namely, "goods" and
"choses in action." The statute 9 therefore can apply to four different
situations, namely, to a contract to sell goods, to a sale of goods, to a
contract to sell a chose in action and to a sale of a chose in action.
The significance of each of these four key concepts will next be
considered.
The connotation that is to be given to a "contract to sell" and a
"sale" as used in the Uniform Sales Act offers no difficulty inasmuch
as both terms are defined expressly in the Act.20 The distinction between the two terms is a fundamental one. In the case of a "contract
to sell," the seller merely agrees to transfer the property in the goods
to the buyer; the actual transfer takes place at some future time. In the
case of a "sale," the seller actually transfers the property in the goods
to the buyer as of the time of the sale.
These absolute terms, namely, "contract to sell" and "sale," are
qualified by the succeeding words "of any goods or choses in action." 21
The first of these two words, namely "goods," as construed by the
Wisconsin Supreme Court include any personal property in existence
at the time of the making of the contract, and also personal property
not ready for delivery or even existent at the time of the making of the
22
contract provided that it need not be made especially for the buyer.
That "goods" means "personal property" is apparent from the following expression of the Wisconsin Supreme Court: "The alleged contract in question was one for the sale of personal property and so
comes within the statute of frauds.... "2-3 Particular illustrations are
the holdings of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin that the following
subjects of contracts to sell or sales are "goods" within the statute of
frauds: wheat, 24 land scrip,22 trees, 2 6 logs, 27 potatoes,28 and the sale of
one-fourth of an interest in a boat. 29 The latter decision indicates that
18 WIs. STAT.
19 Idem.
20 Wis. STAT.

(1941) § 121.04.

(1941) § 121.01. "Contracts to sell and sales.
(1) A contract to sell goods is a contract whereby the seller agrees to
transfer the property in goods to the buyer for a consideration called the price.
(2) A sale of goods is an agreement whereby the sellers transfers the
property in goods to the buyer for a consideration called the price."
21 VIS. STAT. (1941) § 121.04(1).
22
ldei. § 121.04(1) (2); Meinicke v. Falk, 55 Wis. 427, 13 N.W. 545 (1882).
23 Mahoney v. Kennedy, 172 Wis. 568, 179 N.W. 754 (1920).
24 Hooker v. Knab, 26 Wis. 511 (1870); Nichols v. Mitchell, 30 Wis. 329 (1872).
25 Smith v. Bouck, 33 Wis. 19 (1873).
28 Hawkinson v. Harmon, 69 Wis. 551, 35 N.W. 28 (1887).
27 Hansen v. Roter, 64 Wis. 622, 25 N.W. 530 (1885).
28 King v. Graef, 136 Wis. 548, 117 N.W. 1058, 20 L.R.A. (n. 5) 86 (1908).
29
Brown v. Slauson, 23 Wis. 244.

THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS

19421

Wisconsin regards even the sale of an interest in a chattel as personal
property and thus "goods" within the statute of frauds. Whether or not
corporate stock is "goods" within the statute of frauds has been an
issue of considerable controversy in some jurisdictions, but the matter
is definitely settled in Wisconsin, corporate stock being without question included in the term "goods."30 "There may be some doubt arising
from the decisions elsewhere" says the Circuit Court of Appeals of the
Seventh Circuit "as to whether 'corporate stock' is 'goods' as used in
the Statute of Frauds, but for Wisconsin the question is settled by
decision....

1

The statute of frauds 32 itself is authority for the statement that
"goods" includes personal property even though not ready for delivery
or in existence at the time of the making of the contract. It is to be
noted, however, that not all cases in which personal property is involved are held to be within the statute of frauds. The statute expressly
excludes from its scope contracts to sell and sales of goods that are
"to be manufactured by the seller especially for the buyer, and are not
suitable for sale to others in the ordinary course of the seller's business.
.. "3 This provision marks the distinction between contracts for manufacture and sale which are by this provision excluded from the operation of the statute of frauds, and contracts of sale only where there is
nothing for the seller to do but to tender the property, which are within
the statute. Although this enactment would seem to present no special
difficulty, yet a full appreciation of its import especially in view of
some broad language in the cases 34 requires a consideration, not only
of the determinative Wisconsin decisions, but also an examination of
the history of this "exclusion" clause.3 5 Due to border line cases between contracts for manufacture and sale which are not within the
statute and contracts of sale only which are within the statute, there
was much conflict of authority in various jurisdictions as to the rule
by which to determine whether a contract was within one class or the
other, this conflict resulting in the development of three specific rulesthe English Rule,3a the New York Rule,35b and the Massachusetts
30

Mahoney v. Kennedy, 172 Wis. 568, 179 N.W. 754 (1920) ; Backus v. Taplin,
81 Fed. (2d) 444 (C.C.A. 7th, 1936).
31 Backus, ibid.
32 WIs. STAT. (1941) § 121.04.
3 Ibid. § 121.04(2).
34 Gross v. Heckert, 120 Wis. 314, 97 N.W. 952 (1904) ; Boyington v. Sweeney,
77 Wis. 55, 45 N.W. 938 (1890) ; Wiger v. Carr, 131 Wis. 584, 111 N.W. 657
(1907).
3
5 Wis. STAT.

(1941)

§ 121.04(2).

35a Lee v. Griffin, 1 B. & S.272, 101 E.C.L. 272, 121 Reprint 716, 23 E.R.C. 191.
35b Warren Chemical Mfg. Co. v. Holbrook, 118 N.Y. 586, 23 N.E. 908 (1890) ;
Alfred Shrimpton & Sons v. Dworsky, 21 N.Y.S. 461, 2 Misc. 123 (1892);
Seymour v. Daris, 4 N.Y. Super 239.
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Rule. 35C Under the English Rule if the contract is intended to result
in the transfer of a chattel in which the vendee had no previous property, then, although work and labor are to be done on such chattel
before delivery, the contract is within the statute of frauds.35d The
New York Rule states that an agreement for the sale of any commodity
not in existence in solido at the time, but which the seller is to manufacture or put in condition to be delivered is not a contract of sale
within the statute of frauds, 58 but, if at the time of the agreement
the commodity sold substantially exists in its ultimate form,3 5 or is to
be procured in substantially its ultimate form from others,3-g then,
even though acts remain to be done in finishing it, the agreement is a
contract of sale within the statute of frauds. The Massachusetts Rule,
is as follows: "A contract for the sale of articles then existing, or such
as the vendor in the ordinary course of his business manufactures or
procures for the general market, whether on hand at the time or not,
is a contract for the sale of goods, to which the statute applies. But on
the other hand, if the goods are to be manufactured especially for the
purchaser, and upon his special order, and not for the general market,
the case is not within the statute. . . . ,,6 The difference between the
three rules is well stated in an Oregon case3 7 as follows: "By the
Massachusetts rule, the test is not the existence or non-existence of
the commodity at the time of the contract, as in New York, or whether
the contract will ultimately result in the transfer of the title of a chattel from vendor to the vendee, as in England, but whether the article
is such as the manufacturer ordinarily produces in the course of business, and for trade, or as the result of a special order and for special
purposes. If the former, it is regarded as a contract of sale, and within
the statute; if the latter, it is held to be essentially a contract for
labor and material, and, therefore, not within the statute.... ,,as
Under the English Rule, Missouri has held contracts to make a
coat and vest of peculiar design and pattern, 89 and to make a
number of special drawings 40 to be contracts for the sale of goods
and within the statute of frauds. Such contracts would be held to
be contracts for skill and labor and, therefore, not within the scope
of the statute of frauds under the Massachusetts Rule.
35c
35d
35e
3

Goddard v. Binney, 115 Mass. 450 (1874).

Supra, note 29.

Warren Chemical Mfg. Co. v. Holbrook, 118 N.Y. 586, 23 N.E. 908 (1890).
5fAlfred Shrimpton & Sons v. Dworsky, 21 N.Y.S. 461, 2 Misc. 123 (1892).
35g Seymour v. Davis, 4 N.Y. Super 239.
36 Supra, note 31.
7

38

Heintz v. Burkhard, 29 Ore. 55, 54 Am. St. Rep. 777 (1896).

Ident.
a9 Schmidt v. Rozier, 121 Mo. A. 306, 98 S.W. 791 (1906).
40 Lesan Advertiz. Co. v. Castleman, 165 Mo. A. 575, 148 S.W. 433 (1912).
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The Massachusetts Rule, being a part of the Uniform Sales Act,41
is the most generally accepted American doctrine.' It has been adopted
44

43
by thirty-three of the forty-eight states, namely, Alabama Arizona
4 5

Arkansas
51

California

4 6

47

Connecticut,

48

Delaware,

Idaho,

9

50

fllinois,

Indiana, Ioway Kentucky,53 Missouri, 4 Maryland, 55 Massachusetts,, 6
59
Nevada,60 New Hampshire, 61
Michigan, 57 Minnesota5 s Nebraska,
New Jersey,6 New York,63 North Dakota, 64 Ohio, 65 Oregon,6 . Pennsylvania, 67 Rhode Island, 68 South Dakota,
72

mont,

Washington,

Columbia,77

73

7

Wisconsin,

4

69

Tennessee 7 0

Utah71 Ver-

and Wyoming ;75 AIaska,

the Dis-

78

and Hawaii have also accepted the Act. In the
trict of
79
Meinicke case, the Wisconsin Supreme Court referring to the Massachusetts Rule lays down the conforming interpretative Wisconsin
"exclusion" rule as follows: "We are inclined to think that the rule
announced by Chief Justice Shaw ... and followed in Goddard v. Bin4

1WIs.
STAT. (1941) § 121.04(2).
42 Supra, note 37.
43 Hassey v. A. C. Alleyn Co., 306 Ill. App. 37, 28 N.E. (2d) 164 (1940).
44

Iden.
1den.; Cape County Milling Co. v. Morris, 137 Ark. 430, 208 S.W. 792 (1919);
Moore v. Camden Marble Works, 80 Ark. 274, 96 S.W. 1063 (1906).
46 Supra, note 43.
47
Supra, note 43; Atwater v. Hough, 29 Conn. 508, 79 Am. Dec. 229 (1861).
48
Supra, note 43.
49 Supra, note 43.
50
Supra, note 43.
51
52 Supra, note 43.
Supra,note 43.
53
Supra, note 43.
54 Supra,note 43; Crockett v. Scribner, 64 Me. 447 (1875).
55 Supra, note 43.
45

56 Supra, note 43.
57

Supra,note 43; Ericsson Mfg. Co. v. Caille Bros. Co.; 195 Mich. 545, 162 N.W.
81 (1917) ; Willebrandt v. Sisters of Mercy, 185 Mich. 366, 152 N.W. 85 (1915).
c8 Supra, note 43.
59 Supra, note 43.
6
oSupra, note 43; O'Neil v. N. Y. Mining Co., 3 Nev. 141.
61
Supra, note 43.
62
Supra, note 43.
63
Supra, note 43.
6
"Supra, note 43.
65
Supra,note 43.
66 Supra, note 43; Courtney v. Bridal Veil Box Factory, 55 Ore. 210, 105 Pac. 896
(1909).
67 Supra, note 43.
68 Supra, note 43.
69

Supra, note 43.

70
71 Supra, note 43.

Supra, note 43.
Supra, note 43; McDonald v. Webster, 71 Vt. 392, 45 Atl. 895; Scales v. Wiley,
68 Vt. 39, 33 Atl. 771 (1895).
7 Supra, note 43.
74Supra,
note 43; Meinicke v. Falk, 55 Wis. 427, 13 N.W. 545 (1882).
75
Supra, note 43.
76
77 Supra,note 43.
Supra, note 43.
72

789 Supra, note 43.

7 Meinicke v. Falk, 55 Wis. 427, 13 N.W. 545 (1882).
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ney,... is entitled to our confidence and respect. We, therefore, hold
that, while an executory contract for the sale of an article for the
price of $50 or more may be within the statute, notwithstanding such
article does not at the time exist in solido, yet where such contract is
to furnish materials and manufacture the article according to specifications furnished or a model selected, and when without the special
contract the thing would never have been manufactured in the particular manner, shape, or condition it was, then the contract is essentially
for skill, labor, or workmanship, and is not within the statute."80 The
legal basis upon which the Massachusetts Rule is founded is stated as
follows by the Wisconsin Court: Contracts for the purchase of goods
that are to be manufactured especially for the buyer and that are not
suitable for sale on the general market are not within the statute of
frauds because such contracts imply "that the application of such labor
and capital in the execution of the agreement is to be accepted as the
work of the manufacture processes, contingent upon the thing, when
produced, corresponding to that ordered. The result is that, as soon
as the process of manufacture commences the contract is no longer
wholly executory. When the article contracted for is ready for delivery
and the situation is such that it might then form the subject of a sale
within the meaning of the statute, the real contract has been substantially performed upon one side. To allow the statute of frauds to then
interfere with the final consummation of the agreement would be a use
thereof to perpetrate fraud instead of to prevent fraud." 81
Wisconsin, under the Massachusetts Rule, has held the following
contracts to be contracts, not for the sale of goods, but for skill and
labor, and, therefore, not within the statute of frauds: a contract for
a specially-built carriage,8 a contract for the publication of an advertisement in a newspaper, 8 a contract for iron-work to be manufactured
according to a particular design,84 a contract for specially-made matting,85 and a contract for the purchase of certain lithographs and en88
gravings to be made according to a specific design.
However, one Wisconsin case,87 as a result of its general language,
causes a quaere to arise as to whether the Wisconsin "exclusion"
clause's8 should really be limited to goods that are to be manufactured
especially for the buyer or whether this enactment should also embody
80 Idem.
81 Gross v. Heckert, 120 Wis. 314, 97 N.W. 952 (1904).
82 Supra, note 79.

83 Goodland v. LeClair, 78 Wis. 176, 47 N.W. 268 (1890).
84 Heintz v. Burkhard, 29 Ore. 55, 54 Am. St. Rep. 777 (1896).
85 Supra, note 81.
86 Central Lithographing & Engraving Co. v. Moore, 75 Wis. 170, 43 N.W. 1124
(1882).
87 Gross v. Heckert, 120 Wis. 314, 97 N.W. 952 (1904).
88 Wis. STAT.

(1941) § 121.04(2).
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contracts for the sale of any goods that must be manufactured in the
future. In the case in question, namely, the Gross case, 9 the court uses
the following language: "That statute (statute of frauds) relates only
to the executory sales of property; not to contracts for the manufacture and sale of property. Meinicke v. Falk, 55 Wis. 427. .." Accepting this general statement as it stands, it would seem that the Wisconsin "exclusion" clause is meant to include all contracts wherein the
goods must be manufactured in the future regardless of whether these
goods are to be manufactured especially or in the ordinary course of
the seller's business. However, in view of the fact that the court cites
the Meinicke case 90 as authority for its general statement, and in view
of the fact that the case concerns specially made matting, it is apparent
that the court referred only to goods that were to be manufactured
especially for the buyer and which would not be suitable for sale in
the ordinary course of the seller's business. That such is the rule is
thoroughly established by the words of the statute9 itself and the
Hansen case. 92 In that case the court held that a contract for the sale
and delivery of logs was a contract for the sale of goods within the
statute of frauds even though it was necessary for the vendor to cut,
transport and deliver the logs to a certain place. The court spoke as
follows: "The logs were an ordinary article of traffic, like lumber, or
other merchandise, and stand upon the same ground. It could not with
propriety be said that the contract was for special skill and labor. ...
If any other construction were allowed to be given to the opening words
of the court in the Gross case, 94 Wisconsin would not be following the
Massachusetts Rule at all, but rather would be applying the New York
Rule, namely, the non-existence of the article at the time of the contract. General language is found in other Wisconsin cases9" also, but,
in all of these cases the Meinicke case 98 is cited as authority for these
general statements. Thus, it is apparent that the court is really referring
only to goods which are manufactured by the vendor especially for the
vendee and which are not saleable on the general market and that
Wisconsin accepts the Massachusetts Rule.
Besides those contracts which are declared not to be within the
statute of frauds because they fall under the express "exclusion" provision of the statute,97 there is still another type of contract which is
99 Supra,note 87.
90 55 Wis. 427, 13 N.W. 545 (1882).
9
921 Supra,note 88.
Hansen v. Roter, 64 Wis. 622, 25 N.W. 530 (1885).
9
3Idem.
94
Si.pra,note 87.
9
5 Boyington v. Sweeney, 77 Wis. 55, 45 N.W. 938 (1890) ; Wiger v. Carr, 131
Wis. 584 (1907).
96
9 Supra,note 90.
7WIs. STAT. (1941) § 121.04(2).
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declared not to be within the statute although personal property is
involved, namely, those contracts in which the personal property is but
incidental to common services18 or employment99 or a compromise
agreement. 100 In the Agnew case' 0' the Wisconsin Supreme Court held
that a promise to fill lots with dirt was a contract for services and not
a sale of property and, therefore, not within the statute of frauds even
though the transfer of title to the dirt was involved. The Wisconsin
court in a later case'0 2 held that a contract authorizing another to act
as agent and purchase property from a third person was not within the
statute of frauds. In arriving at its decision the court reasoned as follows: "The distinction involved in the employment of one as an agent
to obtain for the principal something which he has not is in close
analogy to that in an employment to manufacture for another that
which at the time of contracting has no existence." In the Mygatt
case'03 the court held that an agreement between two execution creditors, each of whom claimed priority, to allow the property of the
debtor to be sold under one execution and to divide the proceeds equally
is not a sale at all but a compromise of the conflicting claims of the
parties in respect to their priority of levy, and, therefore, not within
the statute of frauds. Another Wisconsin case 04 presented the question
Whether an oral contract between two vendees to jointly purchase a
stock of merchandise and sell part of the goods and then divide the
proceeds and the balance of the goods between themselves was a contract within the statute of frauds. The court held that the contract was
not within the statute of frauds because "the parties do not stand in
the relation of seller and buyer. They agree to buy jointly and to divide
what they buy." In other words, there is no contract to sell or sale at
all; it is merely a contract to divide the interests growing out of a
joint purchase.
The second class of subject-matter to which the statute of frauds
is applicable, is "choses in action." By "choses in action" is meant any
"rights to personal things of which the owner has not the possession but
merely a right of action for their possession." 10 5 The Alexander case'0 6
involving an order drawn upon the county treasurer is a good example
of a sale of a chose in action. The only reason that "choses in action"
are expressly designated in the present Wisconsin statute of frauds is
93 Agnew v. Baldwin, 136 Wis. 263, 116 N.W. 641 (1908).

99 Wiger v. Carr, 131 Wis. 584, 111 N.W. 647 (1907).
100 Mygatt v. Tarbell, 78 Wis. 351, 47 N.W. 618 (1890).
01 Supra, note 98.
102 Supra, note 99.
103 Supra, note 100.
104 Stack v. Roth Bros. Co., 162 Wis. 281, 156 N.W. 148 (1916).
105 BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY (3rd ed. 1933) 323; St. Louis & S. F. Ry. Co. v.
Crews, 51 Okla. 144, 151 Pac. 879 (1915).
' 0 6 Alexander v. Oneida County, 76 Wis. 56, 45 N.W. 21 (1890).
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to avoid any mistaken conception that choses in action are not to be
included within its scope.
The next key word of the statute, 10 7 namely, "of the value of fifty
dollars or upwards," further limits the scope of the statute of frauds,
restricting its scope to contracts to sell or sale of goods or choses in
action of the value of fifty dollars or more. 08 However, regardless of
whether the vendee is purchasing a full or partial interest in the property, the contract. is within the statute if the value of interest purchased is fifty dollars or over. 0 9 The value limit of the Wisconsin
statute is taken from the original English statute of frauds fixing the
limit at £10, which roughly translated corresponds to $50. It has been
suggested, that constantly rising price levels during the last two centuries have gradually made the statute applicable to smaller and smaller
sales and that the limit should be raised. The Uniform Sales Act, as
recommended by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, fixes the
limit at $500 and this amount is fixed in most of the jurisdictions which
have adopted the act. However, the Wisconsin Legislature, notwithstanding the recommendation, has seen fit to retain the original limit.
Having considered what contracts are within the statute of frauds,
we next inquire what must be done in order to 'comply with the statute
if the contract in question is governed by it. Although the statute1,,
itself states the three alternate modes of compliance, yet a consideration of the decisions is necessary in order to properly interpret these
statutory requirements.
The first of the three alternate methods of satisfying the statute of
frauds is expressed as follows in the Wisconsin statute: "the buyer
shall accept part of the goods or choses in action so contracted to be
sold or sold, and actually receive the same."" While the statute specifies acceptance and receipt as necessary requirements to satisfy the
statute, yet the words of the statute "actually receive the same" necessarily include delivery of the goods on the part of the seller."" There
could be no actual receipt on the part of the buyer unless the vendor
delivered the goods. Therefore to constitute a valid sale by a compliance with the first method, there must be 1) delivery of the goods;
2) receipt of the good; and 3) acceptance of the goods. 13
107 Wis'

STAT. (1941) § 121.04(1).

108 Weston v. Dahl, 162 Wis. 32, 155 N.W. 949 (1916).
109
Gerndt v. Conradt, 117 Wis. 15, 93 N.W. 804 (1903).
0

"3 Supra, note 107.

21" Supra,note 107.
1'12Friedman v. Plous, 158 Wis. 435, 149 N.W. 218 (1914) ; Mellen Produce Co.
v. Fink, 225 Wis. 90, 273 N.W. 538 (1937).

113 Supra, note 112; Hansen v. Roter, 64 Wis. 622, 25 N.W. 530 (1885); Bacon
v. Eccles, 43 Wis. 227 (1877); Pike v. Vaughn, 34 Wis. 499; Smith v. Bouck,

33 Wis. 19 (1873).
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Considering the term "delivery," the decisions show that it must be
such a transfer of possession as the property is susceptible of ;114
mere words are not sufficient to constitute delivery." 5 A constructive
or symbolic delivery may satisfy the necessary transfer of possession
to constitute delivery in the case of articles incapable of actual manual
delivery. However, in such case the thing done to effect the transfer
and delivery must be such as to put the goods as fully in the actual
physical control of the buyer as of any other person.1 16 The Mahoney
case" 7' illustrates this rule. In that case an oral contract was made -for
the sale of the stock of a certain company but no stock had as yet been
printed or issued. However, after the making of the contract, the
seller (owner of all the stock) ceased to act as secretary, treasurer and
general manager, and he transferred his checking right to the buyer;
he took no further part at all in the management of the corporation.
The buyer took over the company, appointed his own manager, and
drew checks upon the company's funds in the bank. The issue in the
case was whether there was a sufficient delivery to satisfy the statute
of frauds. The court spoke as follows: "In view of the nature of the
subject matter sold it is difficult to see what more could have been
done to perform the contract. The certificates of stock were not printed
so could not be delivered. . . . The nature of the subject matter of
the sale in this case did not permit of a manual delivery, but delivery
so far as possible was made by plaintiff stepping out and the defendants stepping in. This constituted delivery and acceptance.""" However,
actual manual delivery of the goods is necessary in those cases where
such delivery is possible.'" Moreover, delivery of the goods is not
sufficient in itself to take the contract out of the statute of frauds; the
delivery must be under and pursuant to the contract." ° However, it is
not necessary that all of the goods be delivered in order to constitute
a sufficient delivery; a delivery of a portion of the goods will suffice.' 2
As to the time at which delivery must be made, proper delivery can be
made either when the agreement is made or afterwards.' 2 In certain
circumstances no semblance of an actual physical transfer of the goods
is necessary in order to constitute delivery although actual physical
114Supra, note 112; Roberts, Johnson & Rand v. Machowsld, 171 Wis. 420, 177
N.W. 509 (1920).
:15Supra, note 112.
116 Mellen Produce

Co. v. Fink, 225 Wis. 90, 273 N.W. 538 (1937).
Mahoney v. Kennedy, 172 Wis. 568, 179 N.W. 754 (1920).
11s Idem.
"1

1 9 Supra,note 116.
120 Libman v. Fox-Pioneer Scrap Iron Co., 175 Wis. 485, 185 N.W. 551 (1921).
121 Commonwealth Telephone Co. v. Paley, 203 Wis. 447, 233 N.W. 619 (1931) ;
Gedanke v. Evaporated Milk Co., 215 Wis. 370, 254 N.W. 660 (1934) ; Gano
v. Chi. & N.W. Ry. Co., 66 Wis. 1, 27 N.W. 628 (1886); New Richmond
Roller Mill Co. v. Arnquist, 170 Wis. 130, 174 N.W. 557 (1919).
122 Amson v. Dreher, 35 Wis. 615.

1942]

THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS

transfer is possible. For example, where a person sells his property to
his bailee ;123 where the vendee constitutes the vendor his bailee of the
goods and the vendor thereafter holds these goods as bailee ;124 where
the vendor writes a notation to the effect that he holds the goods as
bailee for the vendee and vendee accepts this instrument ;125 where
the vendee of all the merchandise in a store places a sale sign across
the front of the building, takes the key and assumes control of the
store ;126 where the original vendee resells the property to the original
vendor before any delivery is made under the original sale.12 7 In the
Snider case'2
-1 the Wisconsin court said that "a person can.sell his property to his bailee and make a good delivery thereof without actually
taking the property into his own possession and then returning it to the
possession of the vendee." The court reasoned as follows: "The law is
founded in' reason and common sense, and requires the performance
of no such useless acts to make a sale valid."' 29 In the Janvrin case 30
the court stated that "parties contract without writing for the sale of
goods exceeding fifty dollars in value. There is no payment and no
delivery. The contract is void by statute. But the vendor says to the
vendee, 'I deliver the goods'; and the latter replies, 'I accept them, and
desire you to store them for me as my bailee,' and the contract is good!
.. If such a delivery and acceptance are actually made, it satisfies tle
letter of the statute." The Wisconsin court, in a later case,' 3 1 spoke as
follows: "It would seem that the giving of a written receipt for the
goods by Limits (seller), acknowledging that he held the goods subject to the order of the company, and the acceptance of such receipt
by the company, was a sufficient delivery and acceptance of them by
the company to take the case out of the statute." In an even more recent
case' 22the court held that: "His (buyer's) sign spread across the front
of the building was a public declaration that a delivery sufficient to
effect a sale had been made. His taking and retaining possession of
the key to the premises in which the goods were found, the assuming
control thereover, the subsequent sales by the clerk, all furnish ample
support for the conclusion . . . that there had been a delivery and

acceptance." On the question of retained possession by a repurchasing
vendor and delivery, the Wisconsin court set down the rule that the
retained possessions was equivalent to delivery; "no further delivery
123 Snider v. Thrall, 56 Wis. 674, 14 N.W. 814 (1883).
' 24 Janvrin v. Maxwell, 23 Wis. 51, 82 N.W. 298 (1868).
125 Norwegian Plow Co. v. Hanthorn, 71 Wis. 529, 37 N.W. 825 (1888).
26 Hansen v. Knutson Hrdw. Co., 182 Wis. 459, 196 N.W. 831 (1924).
' Couillard v. Johnson, 24 Wis. 533 (1869).
12s Supra note 123.
129 Supra, note 123.
130 Supra, note 124.
131
Supra, note 125.
' 32 Supra, note 126.
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was practicable or necessary in order to take the transaction out of the
1' 33
statute.
The Wisconsin cases are very much in accord on the question of
delivery with the exception of the Silkman case' 34 The Silkman case
is out of line with the tenor of a number of Wisconsin cases, but it is
especially at variance with the Snider case.2 5 The court in the Silkman
case says, that "the fact that the goods are already in the A's (buyer's)
possession under a prior understanding does not amount to a delivery
or acceptance. There must be some affirmative act of his to take the
case out of the statute."'" 8 A redelivery by the vendee to the vendor
and another delivery by the vendor to the vendee under the circumstances disclosed in the Silkman case would seem to be just such "useless acts" as the Snider case' 37 declared to be unnecessary.
The next two requirements under the first method-of complying
with the statute of frauds, namely, acceptance and receipt, can best
be considered together. The meaning of "acceptance" is stated in the
statute itself as follows: "There is an acceptance of goods within the
meaning of this section when the buyer, either before or after delivery
of the goods, expresses by words or conduct his assent to becoming the
owner of those specified goods."'3 s The Wisconsin case of Friedman v.
Pious 3.8 9 points out the difference between acceptance and receipt and

a later Wisconsin case' 40 further defines receipt: "The statute seems to
separate acceptance from receipt and provide that the former requirement may be satisfied by words or conduct, while the latter presupposes
a delivery by the seller and requires some intentional act of receipt on
the part of the purchaser .... Mere words are not sufficient to establish ... receipt."' 41 "Obviously there can be no actual receipt on the
part of the purchaser in the absence of some affirmative action on his
42
part. Actual receipt cannot result from passive or negative conduct."'
However, a physical delivery is not always necessary to constitute receipt. If the nature of the subject matter of the sale is not such as is
capable of manual receipt, any constructive or symbolic receipt is sufficient to transfer possession and constitute a valid receipt. 43 'There
may be a transfer of possessions although the property remains with
the seller.... But in such case title and possession must be in the unre-

'33 Supra, note 127.

H. Silkman Lumber Co. v. Hunholz, 132 Wis. 610, 112 N.W. 1081 (1907).
135 Snider v. Thrall, 56 Wis. 56, 14 N.W. 814 (1883).
188 Supra,note 134.
'3 Supra,note 135.
'8sWis. STAT. (1941) § 121.04(3).
ISO Friedman v. Pious, 158 Wis. 435 (1914).
140 Roberts, Johnson & Rand v. Machowski, 171 Wis. 420, 177 N.W. 509 (1920).
334J.

141
2

Supra,note 139.

Supra,note 140.
4
1'
Mellen Produce Co. v. Fink, 225 Wis. 90, 273 N.W. 538 (1937).
14
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stricted control of the buyer, so as not to permit .or recall or recision."' 44 As to the time at which acceptance and receipt can be made,
it is evident from the statute (121.04) and the cases 45 that acceptance
,can be made either before or after the contract, and that receipt can be
made either at the time of the making or after the making of the contract. The Mellen Produce Co. case"4 6 states that "to enable acceptance
and receipt of part of the goods to vitalize the oral contract, it is not
necessary that they occur at the time the contract was made." The
Amson case 47 is to the same effecL Moreover, the fact that the vendee
has previously canceled the oral contract will not prevent the operation
of the acceptance and receipt theory if the vendee subsequently receives
and accepts the goods and gives the vendor no notification of rejection
within a reasonable time. 4 s However, where an owner makes an oral
contract of sale with one party and later makes a written contract of
sale with a bona fide third party, any subsequent delivery, acceptance
and receipt under the oral contract of sale after the execution of the
written contract is of no effect and does not take the prior oral con49
tract of sale out of the statute of frauds.
In many cases one of the two requirements is present but the other
is missing, and, as a result, 50 the contract fails. For example, in an
Illinois case the vendee received shares of stock manually but gave no
expression by word or conduct of his assent to become the owner of
the stock. The court held that that was a receipt but no acceptance.
In the Mellen Produce Co. case,' 5 ' the vendee inspected the lumber in
the vendor's yard and said it was satisfactory, but he left the lumber in
the vendor's yard and did no affirmative act in regard to it. The court
held that there was an acceptance but no receipt. However, the court
did point out that if the vendee had left some one in charge of the
lumber for him and thus obtained unrestricted control of title and

possession, there would have been a valid receipt even though the
lumber remained upon the vendor's land. A New York court' 12 held
that despite the fact that the vendee signed a receipt for the delivery
of needle-books as "in good order" and said "It is all right," and even
though the needle-books were left on the sidewalk in front of the
2" Supra, note 143; Dolan Mercantile Co. v. Marcus, 276 Pa. 404, 120 At. 396
(1923); Urbanski v. Kutinsky, 86 Conn. 22, 84 At. 317 (1912); Castle v.
Swift & Co., 132 Md. 631, 104 Atl. 187 (1918).
5
14 Amson v. Dreher, 35 Wis. 615; Mahoney v. Kennedy, 172 Wis. 568, 179 N.W.
754 (1920).
146
Supra,note 143.
' 47 Amson, Supra, note 145.
'14 James Talcott, Inc. v. Cohen, 226 Wis. 418, 275 N.W. 906 (1938).
-19 Gehl Bros. Mfg. Co. v. Hammond-Olsen Lumber Co., 184 Wis. 221, 199
N.W. 147 (1924).
150 Stewart v. Wis. Bridge & Iron Co., 17 F. Supp. 953 (E.D. Ill. 1936).
'5' Mellen Produce Co. v. Fink, 225 Wis. 90, 273 N.W. 538 (1937).

'52

Alfred Shrimpton & Sons v. Dworsky, 21 N.Y.S. 461 (1892).
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buyer's place of business, nevertheless, there was no receipt within
the meaning of the statute of frauds. In the Spear case' 53 the vendor,
in pursuance of an oral contract, delivered stock to the vendee, but
the vendee, not having the purchase price with him, handed the stock
back to the vendor and told him to send the stock to a certain bank
with a draft drawn upon the vendee for the price. The court, in
deciding that there was no receipt and acceptance, held that the vendee
merely agreed to buy the stock and to accept and pay for it afterwards
at the bank. In the Roberts, Johnson, and Rand casel54 the vendee left
a shipment of defective shoes at a railroad depot for two and one-half
months and gave the vendor no notification of rejection. The court
held that there was neither an acceptance nor a receipt. In this regard,
the point is often made that delivery by the vendor to the railroad and
receipt by the railroad constitutes a delivery, acceptance and receipt
by the vendee. However, the decisions 55 show that delivery to a carrier for conveyance to the vendee is prima facie an actual receipt by
the vendee, a carrier being the vendee's agent to receive the goods
-but that the carrier is not the vendee's agent to accept the goods.
In the Weinrich case' 56 the New York court specifically states as follows: "Assuming that the delivery to the carrier was equivalent to an
actual receipt by the buyer, there has been no acceptance of the goods
..." However, inasmuch as acceptance and receipt need not be contemporaneous, and, since delivery to the carrier constitutes delivery to
and receipt by the vendee, it would seem that if the vendee accepted
the goods by word or conduct before delivery to the carrier, then, upon
delivery to the carrier, the statute would be fulfilled.
The question is often raised whether a manual receipt of goods by
.the vendee is not always 'de facto' such conduct as to constitute an
"acceptance." This quaere is answered in the Bacon case 57 as follows:
"We think the question. must be answered in the negative. To hold
otherwise would be to hold that the words "accept" and "receive," as
used in the statute, are synonymous ....

When the seller gives to the

buyer the actual control of the goods, and the buyer accepts such control, he has actually received them. Such a receipt is often evidence of
an acceptance, but it is not the same thing. Indeed, the receipt by the
buyer may be, and often is, for the express purpose of seeing whether
he will accept or not." In order that a receipt may constitute an acceptance "there must be a vesting of the possession of the goods in the
vendee as absolute owner, discharged of all lien for the price on the
153 Spear v. Bach, 82 Wis. 192, 52 N.W. 97 (1892).
.54 171 Wis. 420, 177 N.W. 509 (1920).
'S Hancock Knitting Mills Co. v. Weinreich, 262 N.Y.S. 837, 147 Mics. 235
(1933); Johnson v. Cuttle, 105 Mass. 447, 7 Am. Rep. 545 (1870).
2 Hancock, Supra, note 155.
'5 Bacon v. Eccles, 43 Wis. 227 (1877).
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part of the vendor, and an ultimate acceptance and receiving of the
property by the vendee, so significant that he shall have precluded himself from taking any exception to the quantum or quality of the goods
sold." 158 However, if the vendor delivers goods to the vendee in pursuance of an oral contract and if the vendee receives these goods with
intent to accept them in case they should agree with the sample, and if
they do actually agree with the sample, this is a complete "acceptance"
even though the vendee subsequently refuses to accept the goods.
The intention of the vendee to accept if the goods agree with the
sample, concurring with the fact that they did so agree, is held to
constitute a complete acceptance. 15 9
"Part perforpiance" is often spoken of as a method of satisfying
the statute of frauds. 160 However, this term designates no separate
manner of complying with the statute but is rather a form of compact
terminology for expressing the idea that a delivery, acceptance and
receipt have takdn place. 16 1
Whether or not oral "repurchase agreements," that is, promises to
repurchase the property from the vendee at the option of the vendee,
are rendered unenforceable by the statute of frauds depends wholly
upon who makes the "repurchase" promise. If the vendor owner himself makes the "repurchase" promise as a condition of the sale, the
"repurchase" agreement is valid because "the whole constitutes but an
entire original contract that is sufficiently performed to take it out of
the statute of frauds" ;162 the agreement of the vendee to purchase and
the agreement of the vendor owner to repurchase are parts of an original and entire contract constituting a conditional sale, and the delivery
of the property and the payment of the purchase price satisfies the
statute of frauds. 16 3 Part performance is the ultimate basis for holding
such an agreement valid. If the vendor is selling goods as agent of
another, and, as part of the contract of sale enters into an individual
agreement to repurchase the goods, this "repurchase agreement" is
valid because "the contract between the agent and buyer is in the
nature of a contract of indemnity, which is neither a contract for the
sale of goods, ware, and merchandise, nor a contract to answer for
the debt default or miscarriage of another hence not within the statute
158 Idem.
'159IdeMin;

Smith v. Stoller, 26 Wis. 671 (1870).

160 Mahoney v. Kennedy, 172 Wis. 568, 179 N.W. 754 (1920) ; Cotterill v. Stevens,

10 Wis. 422 (1860) ; Hankwitz v. 'Barrett, 143 Wis. 639, 128 N.W. 430 (1910) ;
Hoberg v. McNevins, 169 Wis. 486, 173 N.W. 221; Gano v. Chi. & N. W.
Ry. Co., 66 Wis. 1, 27 N.W. 628 (1886).
161 Idem.
162 Korrer v. Madden, 152 Wis. 646, 140 N.W. 325 (1913) ; Hankwitz v. Barrett,
143 Wis. 639, 128 N.W. 430 (1910).
63 Vohland v. Gelhaar, 136 Wis. 75, 116 N.W. 869 (1908); Hassey v. A. C.
Alleyn & Co., 28 N.E. (2d) 164 (1940).
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of frauds.' 6 4 The "repurchase agreement" is an original undertaking
made upon a valuable consideration and to subserve the business or
pecuniary purposes of the vendor agent. 65 The question of the enforceability of this type of "repurchase agreement" was merely raised by
the Wisconsin Supreme Court in the Korrer case,' 66 but was expressly
1
' 8 If the
answered by the court in the cases of Lingelback 67 and Hull.
"repurchase promise" is made by a third person, this agreement is unenforceable under the statute of frauds even though made at the time
of the sale and even though it is an "inducing cause thereof because it
is a separate,' distinct and independent agreement from the contract
69
between the parties to the sale consummated.'1
The second method of complying with the statute of frauds is stated
in the statute as follows: "give something in earnest to bind the corftract, or in part payment.'1 7 0 Although the statute contains a disjunc-tive, yet in effect and to all intent and purposes it offers but one manner of compliance-namely, the giving of any personal property,
money or otherwise, as a part of the purchase price.' 71 This construction is placed upon the statute because the two key words of the disjunctive are practically synonymous. 72 "Today," said a New York
court, "the giving of earnest and part payment are practically synonymous. Some overt act is what the framers wanted in addition to
words of mouth. The statute places no limitation on the manner in
which payment shall be made... . The payment may be in the form
of any personal property. 'The statute requires that he should pay some
part of the purchase money. No doubt it must be taken, in its spirit,
to mean anything or part of anything given, by way of consideration,
which is money or money's worth. But the object was to have something pass between 'the parties besides mere words; some symbol like
earnest money'.'' 1 7 3 "Whatever may have been the meaning of the word
'earnest' its statutory meaning is part payment. . . . 'Earnest' seems
understood to be a part of the price'."' 1 4 However, part payment can
be made in many different ways other than by the manual transfer of
money or personal property. For example, a promise to pay the seller's
creditor, accepted by the latter, who thereupon discharges the seller, is
Lingelbach v. Luckenbach, 168 Wis. 481, 170 N.W. 711 (1919).
Hull v. Brown, 35 Wis. 652; Cooper v. Huerth, 156 Wis. 346, 146 N.W. 485.
166 Supra,note 162.
167 Supra,note 164.
168 Supra, note 165.
169 Korrer v. Madden, 152 Wis. 646, 140 N.W. 325 (1913) ; Becher v. Kreul,
164
'18

173 Wis. 273 (1921); Felton v. Cherkasky, 234 Wis. 223, 290 N.W. 591 (1940).
(1941) § 121.04(1).
R. Ablett Co. v. Sencer, 224 N.Y.S. 251, 130 Misc. 416 (1927).
" Idem.; Weidner v. Hyland, 216 Wis. 12, 255 N.W. 134 (1934).
173 Iden.
17oWis. STAT.
'71 Charles
2

174

Groomer v. McMillan, 143 Mo. App. 612, 128 S.W. 285 (1910).
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a part payment within the statute ;175 the fact that the buyer gives credit
to the seller on the debt he owes the buyer is "as much a payment for
them (the goods purchased) as though the money had been paid over
for them."' 76 The actual surrender of the seller!s promissory note by
the buyer; as part of the purchasd money foi goods purchased, is also
77
such a part payment as will take the sale out of the statute of 'frauds.
Nevertheless, in order to constitute part payment, the payment must
run primarily'from the vendee to the vendor.17 For example, neither
the payment of a commission by a vendor to a broker for selling property, nor the transfer of the property by the vendor to the purchaser
constitutes the giving of "something in earnest to bind the contract, or
in part payment."' 9 The quaere concerning whether the giving of a
check is payment within the statute of frauds is answered. as follows
by the Missouri court: "Nothing is better settled than that a check is
not payment, but is only so when the cash is received on it. There is
no presumption that a creditor takes a check in payment arising from
the mere fact that he acceptes it from his debtor. The presumption is
just the contrary. Where payment is made by check drawn by a
debtor on his banker, this is merely a mode of making a cash payment, and not giving or accepting a security. Such payment is only
conditional, or a means of obtaining the money. In one sense the holder
of the check becomes the agent of the drawer to collect the money
on it; and if it is dishonored there is no accord and satisfaction of the
debt."8 0
_As to the time within which the payment of some portion of the
purchase price must be made in order to comply with the statute, all
of, the Wisconsin decisions' 8 ' hold that such "payment . . . must be
made at the time the contract was entered into, and a subsequent payment does not meet the requirements of the statute," except "where
there is a distinct, intelligent reference by both parties, where the payment is made, to the previous void contract, and a declared intent to
make the agreement valid and binding according to the tenor of the
previous negotiation; there the sale may be deemed made in fact 8ats2
that time, and the requirements of the statute are fully satisfied."'
However, in view of the fact that all of these decisions are based upon
the previous version of the statute of frauds which expressly stated
75 Cotterill v. Stevens, 10 Wis. 423 (1860).
276

Norwegian Plow Co. v. Hanthorn, 71 Wis. 529, 37 N.W. 825 (1888).

17

Sharp

v. Carroll, 66 Wis. 62, 27 N.W. 832 (1886).

SSchwanke v. Dhein, 215 Wis. 61, 254 N.W. 346 (1934).
79
80 Idem.
o Supra, note 174.

181 Bates v. Cheesbro, 32 Wis. 594 (1873) ; Kerhof v. Atlas Paper Co., 68 Wis.
674, 32 N.W. 766 (1887) ; Alexander v. Oneida County, 76 Wis. 56, 45 N.W.
21 (1890); Crosby Hrdw. Co. v. Trester, 90 Wis. 412 (1895).
182 Bates, Supra, note 181.
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that the part payment must be made "at the time" of the making of
the contract, and also declared that unless the statute was complied
with the contract would be "void,' 183 these cases are not determinative
in construing the present statute. New York, however, has had occasion to decide upon this very point under the present statute, and, in
so deciding, spoke as follows: "The Legislature has enacted the Uniform Sales of Goods Act as the law of this state.... It will be noted
that the requirement for part payment to be made at the time is
omitted, thus changing the law of this state.... In my opinion, it is
now the law of this state that neither acceptance, receipt nor part
payment need be contemporaneous with the making of the contract,
but may occur at any time thereafter, if under the contradt and prior
to its revocation."184 In another case involving the identical issue, the
New York court stated that "the amendment of the statute of frauds
has eliminated the requirement that the part payment must be made
'at the time' of making the contract."' 8 5 In view of these decisions construing the Uniform Sales Act, it can be said with reasonable certainty
that in Wisconsin, as in New York, neither delivery, acceptance, receipt
nor part payment need be contemporaneous with the making of the
oral contract if made under the contract and prior to its revocation.
The third and most common method of satisfying the statute of
frauds is expressed as follows in the statute: "unless some note or
memorandum in writing of the contract or sale be signed by the party
to be charged or his agent in that behalf."' 8 6 In considering this manner of complying with the statute, it is to be noted that this clause
refers not to a written contract but to a written note or memorandum
of the existing oral contract. The interpretation to be placed on the
two key words' "note or memorandum" is stated by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court as follows: "It is not necessary in order to take the
contract of sale out of the statute of frauds that there be a formal
written contract, nor is it necessary that the written memorandum be
complete in one writing .... It is well established that a complete contract, binding under the statute of frauds, may be gathered from letters, writings, and telegrams between the parties relating to the subject
matter of the contract and so connected with each other that they may
be fairly said to constitute one paper relating to the contract, though
only one of the papers may be signed by the party to be charged. ...
However, it must appear from the several writings, without resorting
183 Supra, note 181.

184

Gordon v. Witty, 198 App. Div. 333, 190 N.Y.S. 381 (1921).

Meyers v. Kaufman, 110 Misc. Rep. 321, 180 N.Y.S. 403 (1920).
88 Wis.STAT. (1941) § 121.04(1).

185
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to parol evidence, what the contract is.'' 8 7 Letters, 18s receipts, 8 9 order
93
92
9
deeds,'1 wills,'
blanks, 190 statements of account,' ' notes," checks,

pleadings, 9 6 advertisements,'19 7 records of municipal affairs, 198 telegrams 99 and memorandum books200 have all be held to be notes or
memorandums within the meaning of the statute. As to the actual contents of the note or memorandum, it must state 1) the parties, and
their respective identities ;201 2) the consideration or price, if the price
has not been paid; if the price has been paid, it need not be specifically
stated ;202 3) the subject matter of the contract ;203 and 4) the signature of the person to be charged.2 0 4 In regard to the description of the
subject matter of the goods, Wisconsin holds that the memorandum of
a sales contract need not describe the goods so minutely and exactly
as to exclude the possibility that other goods than those intended will
fall within the words of the writing; no more is required than that
there be reasonable certainty. 20 As to the time when the note or
memorandum must be made, the cases hold that they may be made at
any time before the action is brought. 00 Further, it is not necessary that
20 7
they be made with the intent of making a note or memorandum.
Concerning the issue of whether or not the note or memorandum must
be delivered in order to satisfy the statute, Williston, citing Wisconsin
authority, 208 says as follows: "Since the memorandum need not itself
be a contract and intent to make it is not requisite, it should follow,
187

S.T. Edwards & Co. v. Shawano Milk Products Co., 211 Wis. 378, 247 N.W.

465 (1933); Western Metals Co. v. Hartman I. M. Co., 303 Ill. 479, 135 N.E.
744 (1922); Singleton v. Hill, 91 Wis. 51, 64 N.W. 588.
188 Hawkinson v. Harmon, 69 Wis. 551, 35 N.W. 28 (1887) ; Schmoll v. Wheeler,
242 Mass. 464, 136 N.E. 164 (1922).
'9 Wis. Club v. John, 202 Wis. 476, 233 N.W. 79.
190 Pearlberg v. Levishon, 112 Misc. 95, 182 N.Y.S. 615 (1920).
'91 Davis v. Arnold, 267 Mass. 103, 165 N.E. 885 (1929).
192 Phillips v. Ocmulgee Mills, 55 Ga. 633 (1876).
193 Harper v. Battle, 180 N.C. 375, 104 S.E. 658 (1920).

194
Campbell v. Thomas, 42 Wis. 437 (1877).
3.95 N aylor v. Shelton, 102 Ark. 30, 143 S.W. 117 (1912).
196

Baird Inv. Co. v. Harris, 209 Fed. 291 (1913).

197 LaForme v. Bradley, 77 N.H. 128, 88 Atl. 1000 (1913).
198

McManus v. Boston, 171 Mass. 152, 50 N.E. 607 (1889).

199 Tarbell Co. v. Grimes, 84 N.H. 219, 149 Atl. 73 (1930) ; St. Edwards Co. v.
200
20
1

Shawano Milk Products Co., 211 Wis. 378, 247 N.W. 465 (1933).
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especially in view of the fact that neither the original statute, nor its
successors, mentions delivery, that a writing retained wholly within
the control of the party to be charged, but which complies with the
other requirements of the statute, should be a sufficient memorandum.

20 9

Any writing by hand, or printed, or typewritten is sufficient to
satisfy the qualifying term "in writing."210
As to the nature of the signature required by the statute, any signature in the form of writing, stamping, printing or typewriting .is
sufficient to meet the calls of the statute if made with the intention of
authentically and finally adopting it as one's own.211 Ii is to be noted
also that, in view of the fact that the note or memorandum is not a
contract, it is not compulsory that both parties to the contract sign; it
is necessary only that one party sign, namely, the party to be charged
or his agent. 212 Moreover, "for the purpose of satisfying the provisions
of a statute requiring a note or memorandum to be signed by the
party to be charged or by his agent,.a memorandum signed by a properly authorized agent with or without indication of the existence or
identity of the principal is sufficient to charge the principal."21 3 On the
question of whether or not the agent must be authorized in writing it
is held in the Kreutzer case214 that in the absence of statutory requirement, an agent need not be authorized in writing to sign a note or
memorandum of a contract for a sale.
Having considered what contracts are within the scope of the
statute of frauds and the three alternate methods of satisfying the
statute the question arises as to who can raise the statute of frauds
as a defense. This is answered in Wisconsin by two cases-the
Draper case21 5 and the Gehl case.2 1 From a reading of these cases it is

evident that the defense of the invalidity of a contract of sale under
the statute of frauds is a personal defense and is not available to
strangers to the contract. Like usury, infancy, and various other
defenses, it can only be relied upon by parties of privies. 1 7 Consequently, where a vendor, by written contract, sells hay to vendee A and
209
210
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later sells the same hay to vendee B by an oral contract, vendee A
cannot raise the statute of frauds in regard to the oral contract between the vendor and vendee B.214 Vendee A is a stranger to the
oral contract. But, where the vendor makes an oral contract of sale
to vendee C first and then sells the same property to vendee D by a
written contract, vendee D can raise the statute of frauds as to the
prior oral contract619 because by making this subsequent written contract of sale the vendor "de facto" repudiated the previous oral contract. The vendor, upon making this subsequent written contract,
said, in effect, to vendee C, "Our contract is unenforceable because
not in writing and I am repudiating it. Therefore, vendee D is not
raising the statute of frauds to question the validity of an oral contract to which he is a stranger; he is merely availing himself of the
fact that the vendor used the statute of frauds to repudiate a prior
oral contract of sale which he, the vendor himself, had made with
vendee C in regard to the same property which he later sold to vendee
D by a written contract.
Concerning the question of oral modification of a contract within
the statute of frauds, the authorities are in accord that no oral modification of the essential terms of a contract required to be in writing
is permitted.22 0 However, no case holds that a collateral agreement
referred to in a contract required to be in writing must be regarded as
22
an essential element of such contract, or that it is within the statute. '
Consequently, a collateral agreement as to wages can be orally modified
though contained in a written contract of sale which, under the statute
of frauds, is required to be in writing.2 22 However, there is one basis
upon which an oral modification of the essential terms of a written
contract within the statute of frauds is permitted, namely, upon the
doctrine of estoppel.2 3 One party to a contract cannot invoke the
statute of frauds to close the door to a trap in which the other party
may be caught by reason of having relied upon an oral agreement
made between the parties. 224 For example, where the parties to a written contract within the statute of frauds make an oral agreement
extending the time for delivery, and the seller relies upon the oral
agreement and would have made delivery within the time specified
218
219
220
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in the written contract if he had not relied on this oral agreement,
the buyer is estopped from asserting that this oral modification of
the written contract was invalid under the statute of frauds.' 5
Whether or not the statute of frauds is a just and equitable law
has often been questioned. It has been asserted that the statute has
outlived its usefulness and is out of place amid the changed legal and
commercial conditions of today.22 6 This viewpoint has its foundation
in the fact that some of the original reasons for requiring the writing,
such as the interest disqualification of the party to a lawsuit have now
disappeared and that it appears to furnish opportunity for a fraudulent defendant to avoid an honest bargain on the mere technical defense
of the statute. However the Wisconsin Supreme Court has taken a
favorable attitude toward the statute, the court expressing itself in
Korrer v. Madden 27 as follows: "The statute of frauds sometimes
works hardships, but it is the law as written by our lawmaking power,
and it is the duty of the courts to enforce it in all cases which come
fairly within its scope. ,Our statute is substantially taken from Statute
29, Cor. II, which has stood the test of over two centuries of time and
change. The English statute was incorporated in our statute law in 1849
and has since remained there without substantial change or amendment. This is pretty substantial evidence that the good which it has
accomplished far outweighs any wrong that has resulted from its
operation.
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